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Abstract
Analytical expressions for the basic reproduction number, R0, have been ob-
tained in the past for a wide variety of mathematical models for infectious dis-
ease spread, along with expressions for the expected final size of an outbreak.
However, what has so far not been studied is the average number of infections
that descend down the chains of infection begun by each of the individuals
infected in an outbreak (we refer to this quantity as the “average number of
descendant infections” per infectious individual, or ANDI). ANDI includes not
only the number of people that an individual directly contacts and infects, but
also the number of people that those go on to infect, and so on until that par-
ticular chain of infection dies out. Quantification of ANDI has relevance to the
vaccination debate, since with ANDI one can calculate the probability that one
or more people are hospitalised (or die) from a disease down an average chain
of infection descending from an infected un-vaccinated individual.
Here we obtain estimates of ANDI using both deterministic and stochastic
modelling formalisms. With both formalisms we find that even for relatively
small community sizes and under most scenarios for R0 and initial fraction
vaccinated, ANDI can be surprisingly large when the effective reproduction
number is > 1, leading to high probabilities of adverse outcomes for one or
more people down an average chain of infection in outbreaks of diseases like
measles.
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1. Introduction
In 1998, Andrew Wakefield published a study that purported a link between
the Mumps/Measles/Rubella (MMR) vaccines and autism [1, 2]. The study has
been widely debunked [3–6], and has since been retracted by the publisher due
to research misconduct and fraud [7]. However, the study has had a significant
and continuing negative impact on attitudes towards vaccination in developed
countries, even though the American Academy of Pediatrics, the Royal Col-
lege of Paediatrics and Child Health, the Institute of Medicine, and the World
Health Organization have considered the evidence and endorsed the safety and
continuing use of vaccines, including the MMR vaccine [8]. Vaccine refusal is
rising [9, 10], and delayed or partial vaccination is also becoming an increasing
problem [10].
From the perspective of public health policy, the focus tends to be on the
population-level risk of an infectious disease outbreak due to substandard vac-
cination coverage, and the potential number of hospitalisations or deaths that
might result should an outbreak occur [10, 11].
At the individual level however, the anti-vaccine proponents in the vaccina-
tion debate tend to over-estimate the risks to the individual should they get
vaccinated, while often under-estimating the risks of adverse outcomes should
they end up catching the disease [12, 13]. From the individual perspective, the
argument might indeed be made for some diseases that an un-vaccinated but
healthy older child or adult might be at somewhat lower risk of adverse outcome
should they get the disease. However, largely overlooked both in the literature
and in the vaccination debate is quantification of the impact that an individ-
ual’s decision not to vaccinate might have on the health outcomes of others
in an outbreak situation, particularly for vulnerable individuals in the popula-
tion like young infants who are too young to be vaccinated; hospitalisations or
deaths that, but for that individual’s decision to not vaccinate, would poten-
tially not have occurred downstream in the infection chain that began with the
deliberately un-vaccinated individual [14].
In this analysis we quantify the average number of infections that are pro-
duced down the chain of infection that begins with an individual. These in-
fections include not only the people that an individual directly infects, but the
people that those go on to infect, and so on until the chain of infection eventu-
ally dies out. We refer to this quantity as the “average number of descendant
infections” per infectious individual, or ANDI.
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Quantification of ANDI allows assessment of the risk to others posed by
the infection of an individual. For example, if the probability of hospitalisation
upon catching a disease is p, the probability that an individual’s infection results
in the hospitalisation of at least one other person down the chain of infection
that began with them is 1− (1− p)ANDI. For large ANDI, this approaches one
even for relatively small p. Thus the risk to an individual should they catch the
disease might be low, but the risk may be high that a long chain of infection that
began with that individual resulted in the hospitalisation or death of another.
Here we set up the mathematical and computational formalisms for estima-
tion of ANDI, using in this introductory work a Susceptible, Infected, Recovered
(SIR) model. We begin by deriving an expression for ANDI from the SIR de-
terministic model, and compare the results to those obtained using a stochastic
Agent Based Monte Carlo (ABMC) computational approach that keeps track
of who infects whom. Deterministic modelling methods have the advantage of
computational tractability [15, 16], especially for large population sizes, but for
values of the effective reproduction number, Reff , close to one, deterministic
models do a poor job of estimation of various quantities associated with an
outbreak, including quantities like the final size and duration [17, 18].
Using these modelling formalisms, we estimate ANDI for a variety of popula-
tion sizes, values of R0, and pre-outbreak prevalence of vaccinated individuals.
As we will show, ANDI grows as logN , but ANDI does not rise monotoni-
cally in Reff . Rather, relatively small values of Reff maximise ANDI, and even
for population sizes representing a small community (for example, N = 10, 000)
ANDI can be surprisingly high, with each infected individual producing on av-
erage one dozen to several dozen descendant infections. Simulation of a measles-
like outbreak in a small community with sub-standard vaccination prevalence
shows that, even in that small population, the probability that at least one
person is hospitalised down an average chain of infection is nearly 100%.
In the following sections, we describe the deterministic and computational
modelling methodology, followed by a presentation of representative results and
discussion.
2. Methods and Materials
2.1. The Kermack-McKendrick deterministic SIR epidemic model
We begin with a compartmental deterministic model that describes the
spread of a disease in a population that consists of susceptible individuals who
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can catch the disease, infectious individuals who may infect them, and recov-
ered and immune individuals. The ordinary differential equations describing the
dynamics of the Susceptible, Infected, Recovered (SIR) epidemic model are [19]
S′ = −β
SI
N
I ′ = β
SI
N
− γI
R′ = γI. (1)
Here we assume that the dynamics of the outbreak occur on a much shorter time
scale than those of population vital dynamics and the dynamics of movements in
and out of the population, and thus the population size is constantN = S+I+R.
It is well known that the basic reproduction number when the entire popula-
tion is na¨ıve prior to the outbreak is R0 = β/γ [19], and the effective reproduc-
tion number is Reff=(1−f
immune)R0, where f
immune is the fraction immune to
the disease before the outbreak. An outbreak occurs when Reff>1 [19]. There
is also the final size relation when Reff>1 [20]
log
S0
S∞
=
R0
N
[
(1−f immune)N − S∞
]
. (2)
For a given population size and f immune, the final size as a fraction of the
population, (S0 − S∞)/N , grows monotonically in R0.
2.1.1. Assessing the average number of descendant infections, ANDI
Let NDI(τ) be the number of descendant infections down the infection chain
begun by an individual who was infected at time τ . Since the total number of
new infections occurring after time τ is S(τ)−S∞, and the fraction of subsequent
infections due to a particular individual at time τ is on average 1/I(τ)1, we have
NDI(τ) =
S(τ) − S∞
I(τ)
. (3)
This relation is valid provided I(τ) ≥ 1.
Let p(τ) be the probability that a susceptible individual is newly infected at
time τ . Since the rate of new infections for an SIR model is −S′(τ), and the
1As an example, when time τ = 0, the index case of the outbreak is responsible for 100%
of the subsequent infections. However, near the peak of an outbreak, when I(τ) may be,
for example, a larger number like 100, the probability that one of those infectious people is
responsible for any given subsequent infection during the remaining outbreak is 1/100.
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total number of individuals infected in the outbreak is (S0 − S∞), we have
p(τ) =
−S′(τ)
S0 − S∞
.
The average number of descendant infections caused by all individuals in
the outbreak is the time average of the NDI for infected individuals at time τ ,
weighted by the probability that the individuals were newly infected at time τ :
ANDI =
∫
∞
0
dτ NDI(τ) p(τ) (4)
= −
∫
∞
0
dτ
S′(τ)
I(τ)
(S(τ)− S∞)
(S0 − S∞)
. (5)
Because the model of Equations 1 is non-linear, no analytic solution for
Equation 5 exists. However for given initial conditions and hypotheses of R0,
estimates of ANDI can be obtained through numerical integration of the system.
2.1.2. Expected dependence of ANDI on the population size
Note that Equation 5 can be recast as
ANDI = −
∫ S∞
S0
dS
(S − S∞)
I(S0 − S∞)
. (6)
We note that the integrand has units of one over the population size, 1/N ,
and the measure is proportional to dN . Thus, we expect the integral to grow
approximately as logN . This is examined numerically in Results Section 3.2.
2.2. Limitations of the deterministic approach
In the derivations presented in Methods Section 2.1, note that Equation 3
only holds when I(τ) ≥ 1. The possibility that I(τ) < 1 is problematic if the
number of susceptible individuals still left to infect, x=S(τ)−S∞, is also greater
than one (particularly if it is much greater than one); in this case, effects due to
population stochasticity will be non-negligible in the overall outbreak dynamics,
and the deterministic approximation will likely be poor. The deterministic
approximation will also be poor for small population sizes, because population
stochasticity will again be non-negligible in that case.
To determine the conditions for which x is large when I <1, we begin by
solving for the phase curve, I(S), obtained from the solution of the Equations 1.
Equations 1 can be recast as
dI/dS =
βSI/N − γI
−βSI/N
=
1
R0
N
S
− 1. (7)
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Integrating Equation 7 with respect to S yields
I =
N
R0
logS − S + c. (8)
For an outbreak with initial conditions I= I0 and S=S0=(1−f
immune)N−I0,
we see that Equation 8 is satisfied when
c = S0 + I0 −
N
R0
logS0
= (1−f immune)N +
N
R0
log
1
S0
. (9)
Substituting this into Equation 8 yields the phase relation
I(S) =
N
R0
log
(
S
S0
)
+ (1−f immune)N − S. (10)
Now when the number still left to infect is x, we have S=S∞ + x. We thus
have
I =
N
R0
log
(
S∞ + x
S0
)
+ (1−f immune)N − S∞ − x. (11)
Note that we can recast this as
I =
N
R0
log
(
S∞
S0
)
+
[
(1−f immune)N − S∞
]
+
N
R0
log
(
1 +
x
S∞
)
− x. (12)
We recognise the first two terms as the two sides of the final size relation in
Equation 2, multiplied by N/R0. The first two terms thus cancel, yielding
I =
N
R0
log
(
1 +
x
S∞
)
− x. (13)
When I = 1, we obtain
N
R0
log
(
1 +
x
S∞
)
− x = 1. (14)
Now, for u ≥ 0, u ≥ log(1 + u)2, thus from Equation 14 we obtain
N
R0
x
S∞
− x ≥ 1. (15)
2Proof: Consider the function g(u) = log(1 + u) − u. Then g(u) = 0 and g′(u) = 1/(1 +
u)− 1 ≤ 0 for u ≥ 0. Thus the maximum of g(u) for u ≥ 0 is g(0) = 0.
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Solving for x thus yields
x ≥
R0S∞/N
1−R0S∞/N
. (16)
As Reff→1, we see from Equation 2 that S∞R0/N→1. Thus, as Reff→1, we
see from Equation 16 that by the time I(τ) falls to one the number still left to
infect in the outbreak, x=S(τ) − S, can be large, and thus the deterministic
formalism in such cases will yield a poor description of the evolution of the SIR
system.
2.3. Stochastic Modelling Methods
To estimate not only the expected value of ANDI, but also the range in that
quantity due to population stochasticity, we used an ABMC model, since it is
only this stochastic modelling formalism that allows us to keep track of who
infects whom at the individual level.
ABMC simulations of epidemics involve setting up probabilistic and/or
heuristic “rules” for the interactions of individuals in the population, and the
sojourn times spent in the disease states [21]. In the ABMC simulation for
the dynamics of an SIR model with homogeneous mixing, at each time step of
length ∆τ (in units of 1/γ), we determined if an infectious individual recov-
ered, with average probability precover = (1 − e−∆τ ). If a sampled uniformly
distributed random number was less than precover, the individual was moved to
the recovered class.
Additionally, at each time step we calculated the expected number of con-
tacts that each susceptible person made with infectious people, βI∆τ/N , and
sampled a Poisson distributed number with this mean. To emulate homogeneous
mixing, we assumed that there was no preferential mixing of the population, and
each individual was equally likely to contact any other individual in the pop-
ulation during a particular time step. If the sampled number of contacts with
infectious people was greater than zero, the susceptible individual was moved
to the infectious class. An individual was randomly sampled from the list of
infectious individuals as the parent of this new infection.
For each infected individual we kept track of the time at which they were
infected, who infected them, and also who they subsequently infected. From
this information, we calculated the number of infected descendants of each in-
dividual, and the average and range of ANDI for all individuals infected in the
outbreak.
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Due to population stochasticity, not all outbreaks progress [22–25]; indeed,
the probability that no individuals are infected beyond the first initial infection
is 1/(1 +Reff) [26, 27]. There has also been a distinction made between “minor”
outbreaks where just a few individuals are infected before the outbreak sputters
out, and “major” outbreaks where the final size is much closer to the deter-
ministic prediction [26]. Here we take a conservative approach, and estimate
ANDI from both minor and major outbreaks in the ABMC simulations; this
will underestimate ANDI compared to estimation using only major outbreaks,
and thus in essence represents the “best case scenario” assessment of risk to the
population posed by un-vaccinated individuals.
To cross-check the fidelity of the ABMC simulations, we also employed a
continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC) SIR model [22], and compared the final
size distributions given by the two simulation methods to ensure that they were
consistent (note that the CTMC model cannot track who infects whom).
For even moderate population sizes and even modestly largeReff , the ABMC
simulations were computationally intensive, and required the use of high perfor-
mance computing resources to achieve a large number of stochastic realisations
of the system. The simulations in this analysis were performed using the high
performance computing platforms at Arizona State University and Texas Tech
University. The authors have produced a library for the R statistical program-
ming language that contains functions that perform both the deterministic and
stochastic modelling methods applied in this analysis. The R ANDI library can be
downloaded from the GitHub repository https://github.com/smtowers/ANDI.
To do this at the R command line, type
require("devtools")
install_github("smtowers/ANDI")
require("ANDI")
An example R script showing the use of the methods can be found at
https://github.com/smtowers/ANDI/example.R.
2.4. Modelling scenarios examined
We used both the deterministic and stochastic formalisms to obtain estimates
of ANDI and the outbreak final size for values of R0 between 1.1 to 4 in steps
of 0.1, under the assumption that the initial population was entirely susceptible
except for one infectious individual. We did this for population sizes N = 1, 000,
N = 2, 500, N = 5, 000, N = 7, 500 and N = 10, 000, and also for N = 100, 000
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with a smaller selection of representative values of R0. For each value of R0
and N , we performed at least 5, 000 stochastic realisations. The stochastic
modelling formalism was computationally intensive and the complexity grows
non-linearly in N ; thus, due to the wide variety of reproduction number values
we examined, it was computationally infeasible to examine larger population
sizes in this analysis. However, with the population sizes we did examine, we
were able to estimate the apparent dependence of ANDI on N , R0, and the
final size.
The one group SIR model we employed in this analysis did not explicitly
include a vaccinated class, but we were nevertheless able to examine scenarios
that involved a fraction of the population that was effectively vaccinated and
fully immune to the disease prior to the outbreak by including those individuals
in the initial conditions for the “recovered” class. An example of a disease for
which this is a good approximation is measles, for which the vaccine is known to
have an efficacy in excess of 95% [10, 28–30], usually conferring life-long humoral
immunity [31]. Measles has a high basic reproduction number in the absence
of vaccination, between 11 to 18 [10, 32]. Thus, even though vaccination rates
usually exceed 90% in most areas of the US, the effective reproduction number
is still high enough that outbreaks are possible [10].
Using the deterministic and stochastic modelling formalisms, we thus sim-
ulated a measles-like outbreak with basic reproduction number R0 = 15 in a
population size of N = 10, 000, examining various scenarios where the pre-
immune fraction, f immune, was sampled from 0 to 1 in steps of 0.1.
3. Results
3.1. Relationship between ANDI and R0 and the final size
In Figure 1 we show the results of the deterministic and ABMC simulations,
showing the predicted ANDI versusR0, and versus the final size of the outbreak,
when the population size is N = 1, 000 and for the various hypotheses of R0
for outbreaks occurring in entirely na¨ıve populations. In Figure 2 we show the
results when the population size is N = 10, 000 and for the various hypotheses of
R0. For values of R0 ' 1.5 the deterministic and ABMC modelling results are
in agreement. For small values of R0 the predictions diverge, and the ABMC
model is preferred.
For an outbreak in a small community with population N = 10, 000, the
ABMC results indicate that ANDI is maximised for middling values of R0
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around 1.2 to 1.5, and for outbreak final sizes around 20%.
3.2. Relationship between ANDI and the population size
In Figure 3 we show the variation of ANDI versus the logarithm of the popu-
lation size for the deterministic and ABMC simulations under a range of values
of the reproduction number. Both the deterministic and ABMC modelling re-
sults for ANDI show a linear dependence on logN , but for small values of R0
the disagreement between the ABMC and deterministic intercept terms is due
to the poor approximation of the deterministic model under those conditions,
for the reasons discussed in Methods Section 2.2.
Figure 1: The left hand plot shows the average number of descendant infections, ANDI,
versus the basic reproduction number, R0, for N = 1, 000 and various hypotheses of R0
between 1.1 to 4, as estimated by the ABMC stochastic SIR modelling formalism described in
Methods Section 2.3. The right hand plot shows ANDI versus the final size of the outbreak.
Overlaid are the predictions derived from the deterministic SIR model, described in Methods
Section 2.1. The height of the grey bars represents the one standard deviation variation of
the ABMC results within bins of R0, or bins of final size. Note that the slight side-to-side
scatter in the left hand plot is for clarity of display purposes only; each point corresponds to
a stochastic realisation of the ABMC simulation at an exact value of R0.
3.3. Relationship between ANDI and pre-immunity of the population
Using the deterministic and stochastic modelling formalisms, we simulated
an SIR outbreak with basic reproduction numberR0 = 15 in a population size of
N = 10, 000, and with hypotheses of the pre-immune fraction, f immune, ranging
from 0 to 1 in steps of 0.1. The results showing ANDI versus the pre-immune
fraction are shown in Figure 4.
From Figure 4, we note that ANDI is almost constant for low to middling
values of f immune, but rises as f immune approaches the point where Reff becomes
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Figure 2: As Figure 1, but with population size N = 10, 000.
close to one. This emulates the situation in some developed countries where,
in some locales, vaccination coverage has dropped just below the level where
measles outbreaks are now possible.
From Figure 4, we note that in small community of population size N =
10, 000, the ABMC simulations indicate that ANDI is approximately 12 when
f immune=0.9 for our hypothetical measles outbreak (95% CI [1.50, 19.8]). For
larger population sizes, this will grow as logN . The case hospitalisation rate
of measles is high, with post-outbreak analyses estimating it to be between
16 − 43% [33–36]. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) estimates on
average 25% of cases require hospitalisation, and approximately 0.2% result in
death (see https://www.cdc.gov/measles/about/complications.html, ac-
cessed December, 2018). From the ABMC simulation, the estimated probability
that at least one person in an average descendant chain of infection in a popu-
lation size of N = 10, 000 is hospitalised in this hypothetical measles outbreak
with f immune=0.9 is thus 1− (1− 0.25)12 = 0.97 (95% CI [0.35, 1.00]), and the
estimated probability that at least one person in an average descendant chain
of infection dies is 1− (1 − 0.002)12 = 0.024 (95% CI [0.003, 0.039]).
4. Discussion and Summary
In this introductory work, we for the first time have quantified the aver-
age number of descendant infections, ANDI, that spread down the chains of
infection that begin with individuals infected in an outbreak. Quantification
of ANDI is necessary to quantify the risk to others posed by the infection of
11
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Figure 3: Variation of ANDI versus the logarithm of the population size, as predicted by
the deterministic and ABMC models for various values of the reproduction number. The
disagreement in the values for small R0 are for the reasons discussed in Methods Section 2.2.
The vertical bars on the ABMC model results indicate the one standard deviation variation
in the simulation results.
un-vaccinated individuals in an outbreak of a vaccine-preventable disease; the
higher the ANDI, the more likely at least one person down an average chain of
infection is hospitalised or dies.
Unlike outbreak final size, which grows linearly in population size, N , and
grows monotonically in Reff , we found that ANDI grows as logN , and is larger
for relatively small values of Reff rather than for large values, and in such cases
ANDI can be remarkably high, with average infection chains consisting of many
people even in modestly sized communities. The fact that ANDI does not grow
in Reff can be conceptualised as follows; the final size grows monotonically in
Reff , but because of the rapid proliferation of the number infected early in
a high Reff outbreak, there are many more infected individuals subsequently
“sharing the pie” of those left to infect in outbreak. However, our stochastic
simulations showed that asReff→1, effects due to population stochasticity begin
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Hypothetical disease outbreak R0=15  N=10000
ANDI vs fraction pre−immune
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Figure 4: The average number of descendant infections, ANDI, versus the fraction of the
population with pre-immunity to the disease for a hypothetical measles-like outbreak with
R0 = 15 in a population of N = 10, 000 individuals. The vertical bars on the ABMC model
results indicate the one standard deviation variation in the simulation results.
to dominate, and the chains of infection tend to die out quicker, leading to a
reduction in ANDI. The apparent dependence of ANDI on logN is similar to the
logN dependence of the average path length in random networks [37]. Further
study is needed to elucidate the potential reasons for this.
While the model examined in this introductory work was a Susceptible, In-
fected, Recovered model without a specific “vaccinated” compartment, it can
nevertheless be used to simulate outbreaks in populations where a fraction of
the population has immunity to the disease prior to the outbreak (for example,
because they had been vaccinated with a highly effective vaccine). In our anal-
ysis we simulated a hypothetical measles-type outbreak in a relatively small
community of N = 10, 000 people, assuming some fraction of the population
had prior immunity due to completely effective vaccination. When the frac-
tion of pre-immune individuals in the population is just below the limit where
an outbreak can occur, with effective reproduction number Reff ∼ 1.5 (sim-
ilar to the estimated Reff in observed measles outbreaks in populations with
just-substandard vaccine coverage [29]), we found that ANDI is approximately
a dozen individuals. Because ANDI is large, we found that the probability that
13
at least one individual gets hospitalised down an average descendant infection is
close to one in this hypothetical outbreak, even for this modest population size.
The probability will grow even closer to one for larger population sizes, due to
the dependence of ANDI on logN . Because the average descendant chain of
infection can be remarkably long, the un-vaccinated individual may likely not
even directly know the person(s) hospitalised down their infection chain, and it
is this distance of association that can lead to under-estimation of the impact
of non-vaccination on others.
It is important to note that infants under the age of one year are too young
to be vaccinated for most infectious diseases, and also tend to be at highest
risk of hospitalisation upon catching such diseases. Approximately 1.2% of the
population consists of infants too young to be vaccinated for measles3; thus,
when 5% to 10% of the population is un-vaccinated (for example), a relatively
large fraction of that un-vaccinated population consists of infants. Indeed, in
a recent outbreak of measles in California, it was observed that almost 25%
of the cases in un-vaccinated individuals occurred in infants too young to be
vaccinated [35]. Thus, while individuals in descendant infection chains include
purposely un-vaccinated individuals, a significant fraction can consist of vuner-
able people who had no choice but to be un-vaccinated [14].
The model used in this initial work made several simplifying assumptions,
including homogeneous mixing of the individuals. It also did not explicitly
include a vaccinated class, but as mentioned above, we could nevertheless use
the model to assess ANDI in the scenario of where a portion of the individuals
in a population are vaccinated with a fully effective vaccine. The deterministic
and stochastic formalisms we have developed form the basis for a wide array of
future related work, including expanding the model to include partially effective
vaccination, age groups, other heterogeneities in transmission, latent periods,
etc. While we examined measles-type outbreaks in this analysis, the modelling
formalism can be expanded to simulate outbreaks for a wide variety of other
vaccine-preventable diseases, including pertussis, influenza, and varicella.
We expect this work and its future derivatives will be impactful in informing
the vaccination debate, particularly for hesitant parents who might be swayed
by the realisation that what might appear to be a personal decision that only
3The 2017 census data on the U.S. population in one year age group can be downloaded
from https://bit.ly/2CEtI8W, accessed December, 2018.
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affects their child actually has potential grave impacts on others in society.
15
References
[1] AJ Wakefield, SH Murch, A Anthony, J Linnell, DM Casson, M Malik,
M Berelowitz, AP Dhillon, MA Thomson, P Harvey, et al. Ileal-lymphoid-
nodular hyperplasia, non-specific colitis, and pervasive developmental dis-
order in children (RETRACTED). The Lancet, 351:637–41, 1998.
[2] Andrew J Wakefield. MMR vaccination and autism. The Lancet, 354(9182):
949–950, 1999.
[3] Dennis K Flaherty. The vaccine-autism connection: a public health crisis
caused by unethical medical practices and fraudulent science. Annals of
Pharmacotherapy, 45(10):1302–1304, 2011.
[4] Dorota Mrozek-Budzyn, Agnieszka Kieltyka, and Renata Majewska. Lack
of association between measles-mumps-rubella vaccination and autism in
children: A case-control study. The Pediatric infectious disease journal, 29
(5):397–400, 2010.
[5] James A Kaye, Maria del Mar Melero-Montes, and Hershel Jick. Mumps,
measles, and rubella vaccine and the incidence of autism recorded by gen-
eral practitioners: a time trend analysis. BMJ, 322(7284):460–463, 2001.
[6] Loring Dales, Sandra Jo Hammer, and Natalie J Smith. Time trends in
autism and in MMR immunization coverage in California. JAMA, 285(9):
1183–1185, 2001.
[7] Ferric C Fang, R Grant Steen, and Arturo Casadevall. Misconduct accounts
for the majority of retracted scientific publications. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences, 109(42):17028–17033, 2012.
[8] David AC Elliman and Helen E Bedford. Measles, mumps and rubella
vaccine, autism and inflammatory bowel disease. Pediatric drugs, 4(10):
631–635, 2002.
[9] David E Sugerman, Albert E Barskey, Maryann G Delea, Ismael R Ortega-
Sanchez, Daoling Bi, Kimberly J Ralston, Paul A Rota, Karen Waters-
Montijo, and Charles W LeBaron. Measles outbreak in a highly vaccinated
population, San Diego, 2008: role of the intentionally undervaccinated.
Pediatrics, 125(4):747–755, 2010.
16
[10] Maimuna S Majumder, Emily L Cohn, Sumiko R Mekaru, Jane E Huston,
and John S Brownstein. Substandard vaccination compliance and the 2015
measles outbreak. JAMA pediatrics, 169(5):494–495, 2015.
[11] Centers for Disease Control, Prevention (CDC, et al. National, state,
and local area vaccination coverage among adolescents aged 13-17 years—
United States, 2009. MMWR. Morbidity and mortality weekly report, 59
(32):1018, 2010.
[12] Anna Kata. A postmodern Pandora’s box: anti-vaccination misinformation
on the Internet. Vaccine, 28(7):1709–1716, 2010.
[13] Anna Kata. Anti-vaccine activists, Web 2.0, and the postmodern
paradigm–an overview of tactics and tropes used online by the anti-
vaccination movement. Vaccine, 30(25):3778–3789, 2012.
[14] Arthur L Caplan, David Hoke, Nicholas J Diamond, and Viktoriya
Karshenboyem. Free to choose but liable for the consequences: Should
non-vaccinators be penalized for the harm they do? The Journal of Law,
Medicine & Ethics, 40(3):606–611, 2012.
[15] Juan Pablo Aparicio and Mercedes Pascual. Building epidemiological mod-
els from R0: an implicit treatment of transmission in networks. Proceedings
of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences, 274(1609):505–512,
2007.
[16] Hazhir Rahmandad and John Sterman. Heterogeneity and network struc-
ture in the dynamics of diffusion: Comparing agent-based and differential
equation models. Management Science, 54(5):998–1014, 2008.
[17] Priscilla E Greenwood and Luis F Gordillo. Stochastic epidemic model-
ing. In Mathematical and statistical estimation approaches in epidemiology,
pages 31–52. Springer, 2009.
[18] William Tritch and Linda JS Allen. Duration of a minor epidemic. Infec-
tious Disease Modelling, 3:60–73, 2018.
[19] Fred Brauer and Carlos Castillo-Chavez. Mathematical models in popula-
tion biology and epidemiology, volume 40. Springer, 2012.
[20] Joel C Miller. A note on the derivation of epidemic final sizes. Bulletin of
mathematical biology, 74(9):2125–2141, 2012.
17
[21] Dirk Helbing. Agent-based modeling. In Social self-organization, pages
25–70. Springer, 2012.
[22] Linda JS Allen. An introduction to stochastic processes with applications
to biology. Chapman and Hall/CRC, 2010.
[23] Linda JS Allen and P van den Driessche. Relations between deterministic
and stochastic thresholds for disease extinction in continuous-and discrete-
time infectious disease models. Mathematical biosciences, 243(1):99–108,
2013.
[24] Thomas House, Joshua Ross, and David Sirl. How big is an outbreak likely
to be? methods for epidemic final-size calculation. Proceedings of the Royal
Society A, 469(2150):1–22, 2013.
[25] Andrew J Black and JV Ross. Computation of epidemic final size distri-
butions. Journal of theoretical biology, 367:159–165, 2015.
[26] P Whittle. The outcome of a stochastic epidemica note on Bailey’s paper.
Biometrika, 42(1-2):116–122, 1955.
[27] Norman TJ Bailey et al. The mathematical theory of infectious diseases
and its applications. Charles Griffin & Company Ltd, 5a Crendon Street,
High Wycombe, Bucks HP13 6LE., 1975.
[28] Wieslawa Janaszek, Nigel J Gay, and Wlodzimierz Gut. Measles vaccine
efficacy during an epidemic in 1998 in the highly vaccinated population of
Poland. Vaccine, 21(5-6):473–478, 2003.
[29] Joe¨l Mossong and CP Muller. Estimation of the basic reproduction num-
ber of measles during an outbreak in a partially vaccinated population.
Epidemiology & Infection, 124(2):273–278, 2000.
[30] Michiel van Boven, Mirjam Kretzschmar, Jacco Wallinga, Philip D O’Neill,
Ole Wichmann, and Susan Hahne´. Estimation of measles vaccine efficacy
and critical vaccination coverage in a highly vaccinated population. Journal
of the Royal Society Interface, 7(52):1537–1544, 2010.
[31] Ian J Amanna, Nichole E Carlson, and Mark K Slifka. Duration of humoral
immunity to common viral and vaccine antigens. New England Journal of
Medicine, 357(19):1903–1915, 2007.
18
[32] Pedro Plans-Rubio´. Evaluation of the establishment of herd immunity in
the population by means of serological surveys and vaccination coverage.
Human vaccines & immunotherapeutics, 8(2):184–188, 2012.
[33] Susan Van den Hof, Marina AE Conyn-van Spaendonck, and Jim E van
Steenbergen. Measles epidemic in the Netherlands, 1999–2000. The Journal
of infectious diseases, 186(10):1483–1486, 2002.
[34] Angela Domı´nguez, Nuria Torner, Irene Barrabeig, Ariadna Rovira,
Cristina Rius, Joan Cayla, Elsa Plasencia, Sofia Minguell, M Rosa Sala,
Ana Mart´ınez, et al. Large outbreak of measles in a community with high
vaccination coverage: implications for the vaccination schedule. Clinical
infectious diseases, 47(9):1143–1149, 2008.
[35] Jennifer Zipprich, Kathleen Winter, Jill Hacker, Dongxiang Xia, James
Watt, and Kathleen Harriman. Measles outbreak–California, December
2014-February 2015. MMWR. Morbidity and mortality weekly report, 64
(6):153–154, 2015.
[36] Tine Grammens, Carole Schirvel, Sylvie Leenen, Nathalie Shodu, Veronik
Hutse, Elise Mendes da Costa, and Martine Sabbe. Ongoing measles out-
break in Wallonia, Belgium, December 2016 to March 2017: characteristics
and challenges. Eurosurveillance, 22(17), 2017.
[37] Agata Fronczak, Piotr Fronczak, and Janusz A Ho lyst. Average path length
in random networks. Physical Review E, 70(5):056110, 2004.
19
